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Abstract
We present SAFE, an integrated system for managing
trust using a logic-based declarative language. Logi-
cal trust systems authorize each request by construct-
ing a proof from a context—a set of authenticated logic
statements representing credentials and policies issued
by various principals in a networked system.
A key barrier to practical use of logical trust systems
is the problem of managing proof contexts: identifying,
validating, and assembling the credentials and policies
that are relevant to each trust decision. This paper de-
scribes a new approach to managing proof contexts using
context linking and caching. Credentials and policies are
stored as certified logic sets named by secure identifiers
in a shared key-value store. SAFE offers language con-
structs to build and modify logic sets, link sets to form
unions, pass them by reference, and add them to proof
contexts. SAFE fetches and validates credential sets on
demand and caches them in the authorizer. We evaluate
and discuss our experience using SAFE to build secure
services based on case studies drawn from practice: a se-
cure name service resolver, a secure proxy shim for a key
value store, and an authorization module for a networked
infrastructure-as-a-service system with a federated trust
structure.
1 Introduction
Trust management deals with specifying and interpreting
security policies, credentials, and relationships among
entities in a system to reach an authorization deci-
sion [11]. Authorization determines whether a certain
request (e.g., read, write) on one or more objects (e.g.,
file, process), is permitted by the requesting principal.
Credentials are statements about the principals issued by
concerned parties delegating the chain of trust. To en-
force a given policy, each entity in the trust management
system has a reference monitor (a guard) that uses cre-
dentials in conjunction with the request to infer the au-
thorization decision.
Over time, the formal foundations of trust manage-
ment systems have converged on logic-based declarative
languages—trust logic. One prominent early example of
trust management is SPKI/SDSI [20], in which partici-
pants exchange statements binding principals to names in
local name spaces. Halpern et al. showed that the nam-
ing language in SPKI/SDSI has a logical semantics [22]
and Howell et al provided formal semantics [24] that has
roots in logic. Li et al. [30, 31] showed that SPKI/S-
DSI naming maps to a Role-based Trust (RT) language,
and that the RT language in turn reduce to datalog with
constraints [14], a logic language with well-understood
formal properties including tractability.
However despite the flexibility and extensibility of
trust logics, their application to practice is limited. We
observe some key obstacles in harnessing the power of
trust logics in practical distributed systems:
1. Credential discovery. Given a query, how to iden-
tify and assemble the tailored proof context that is
relevant to an authorization decision?
2. Credential freshness and revocation. Scalable re-
vocation is a major issue with the deployment of
PKI based systems. The challenge is how to revoke
an issued credential and propagate the changes in a
timely fashion in a distributed setting?
3. Usability. Usability is an important goal for mak-
ing trust logics practical and approachable. How to
make trust logics programmable so that symbolic
names are used rather than low-level identifiers for
principals and objects? How to specify trust poli-
cies and perform access checks so that the system
integrates naturally with the service programming
environment?
4. Federated trust. How to name and collaboratively
share resources among federated trust domains ad-
hering to local trust policies and system constraints?
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// nil
principal(’edu-PK’).
edu’s namespace
.  // dot
cn(’.’).
link(’ICANN-ID:net’).
link(’ICANN-ID:edu’).
link(’ICANN-ID:org’).
link(’ICANN-ID:com’).
ICANN’s namespace
Explicit slogset reference
Write capability on a slogset
Out-of-band/Implicit slogset reference
 // nil
principal(’ICANN-PK’).
net
srn(’net’, ’net-ID’).
link(’net-ID:net’).
edu
srn(’edu’, ’edu-ID’).
link(’edu-ID:edu’).
edu
cn(’duke’).
link(’edu-ID:duke’).
link(’edu-ID:unc’).
duke
srn(’duke’, ’duke-ID’).
link(’duke-ID’).
// nil
principal(’duke-PK’).
duke’s namespace
duke
cn(’duke’).
link(’duke-ID:math’).
link(’duke-ID:cs’).cs
srn(’cs’, ’cs-ID’).
link(’cs-ID:cs’).
cs-ID: link(’cs-ID:ip’).
ICANN-ID
duke-ID
edu-ID
role/cs-admin
speaksForOn(’cs-ID’, ’duke-ID’, ’cs’).
cs’s namespace
// nil
principal(’cs-PK’).
cs-ID
cs
cn(’cs’).
link(’cs-ID:ip’).
ip
a(’cs.duke.edu’, ’152.3.0.1’).
a(’cs.duke.net’, ’152.3.0.2’).
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Figure 1: Workflow illustrating credential discovery, context building, context caching, and proof validation process for a se-
cure name service—SafeNS—emulating DNSSec resolver implemented in SAFE. The credentials are issued a priori (step 0) and
materialized as slogsets in a shared distributed store (SafeSets). The principal cs writes to a slogset owned by duke due to
a speaksForOn capability issued by the owning principal (step 0). The SAFE process starts with a bearer slogset reference
(ICANN-ID) provided by the client and traverses the credential graph via links—building a tailored context as per the resolver’s
programming logic written in slang (steps 1-17). The slang runtime invokes the slog interpreter importing the relevant context—
and slog interpreter validates the proof based on local trust anchors and policies, and certifies the response (steps 18-20) similar to
certified validation in SD3 [25].
To this end we built an integrated logical trust sys-
tem called SAFE.1 At the core of SAFE is a simple trust
logic (SAFE logic or slog) based on extended datalog
with constraints. Slog is similar in spirit to Binder [18],
SD3 [25], Soutei [36], and SENDLog [3]. These logics
can capture important examples of secure network sys-
tems. For example, SD3 has been used to implement
DNSSec [25] resolver, and SENDLog has been used
to implement secure routing protocols that build on the
declarative routing approach.
What is novel about SAFE is its approach to managing
contexts—sets of credentials and other logic content—
and the relationships among them. SAFE builds on a key
concept called set linking, a powerful technique to orga-
nize sets of logic statements. A link is a meta-predicate
of the credential set and serves much like a hyperlink in
HTML documents. A logic set (slogset) may link to a
target set by its name: the link incorporates the target
as a subset, forming a union. A construction procedure
integrates set linking with common primitives for dele-
gation and endorsement, naturally materializing a graph
1SAFE is an acronym for Secure Authorization for Federated Envi-
ronments. The source repository is available at [38].
in which each set links to the other sets needed to sub-
stantiate it. A guard specifies a context as a linked union
of top-level sub-contexts (e.g., slogsets associated with
the subject, object, and policy). The transitive closure
of the sub-context contains all sets relevant to a given
authorization decision. Set linking also facilitates flex-
ible policy because it easy to attach policy rule sets to
nodes in the graph. The cost of linking is low because
common subsets are cached at the authorizer. A further
advantage with linking and shared storage is that the cre-
dentials can be prefetched and cached naturally to sup-
port the materialized context sets for the future queries.
Figure 1 shows a workflow of SafeNS—a secure name
service emulating the DNSSec resolver implemented in
SAFE (see Sec 3.4).
In addition, SAFE offers a scripting language called
“slang” that manipulates sets of authenticated logic state-
ments (slogsets) as first class content objects with unique
names. Contrast to slog, which is used as a certifying
proof engine, slang is used primarily for credential dis-
covery, certificate issuing and revocation, and tailoring
proof context based on authorizer’s policies. Separating
the credential discovery process from proof validation is
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important to ensure the inference is tractable. We are
also motivated to design slang to make trust logics more
usable in practice—slang is declarative and makes the
crypto operations transparent and provides built-in hooks
to integrate with the service programming environment.
Slang provides support for higher order logical seman-
tics such as speaksFor and aggregation, which
cannot be captured in slog due to lack of of function
symbols and nesting. Slang offers language constructs to
build and modify slogsets, publish them by name, fetch
them by reference, and add them as sub-contexts to a
proof context. The name space enables slogsets to be
passed by reference, fetched on demand, and cached af-
ter validation at the receiver. In future exchanges the re-
ceiver may retrieve sets from its cache as needed, avoid-
ing the need to transmit and validate them again. Slogsets
are themselves stored in a shared, secure, and distributed
credential store called as SafeSets. Each object in Safe-
Sets is signed by its speaker to enable a third-party to
verify the authenticity and integrity of the source. The
shared store is also a basis for addressing perennial prob-
lems with PKI certificate management, e.g., revocation,
renewal, and key rotation.
Contributions. Our research focuses on practical
challenges for using logical trust in secure networked
systems. Our premise is that trust logic can be as fast
as PCAs and as simple identity-based access control
schemes (e.g., ACLs) in the common case, while en-
abling rich and flexible declarative trust with a precise
and rigorous logical semantics and verifiable policies.
More generally, we believe that logical trust can be a fun-
damental enabler for a network security architecture that
is richer, safer, and more flexible than the architecture in
place today (e.g., X.509 and CA hierarchy). We make
these contributions:
1. A high productivity programming tool for manag-
ing credentials declaratively based on language ex-
tensions to trust logics including tractable delega-
tion with speaksFor, policy mobility, and server
integration (Sec 3).
2. A shared, secure, and distributed credential store
that leverages the concept of set linking to organize
credentials (Sec 4).
3. An evaluation to demonstrate that SAFE is practical
including the implementation of secure name ser-
vice (SafeNS) and an authorization system GENI 2
(SafeGENI) in a hundred lines of SAFE scripting
language (Sec 5).
2GENI is a networked infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) with au-
tonomous IaaS providers linked in a federated trust structure.
2 Logical Trust on the Network
In this section, we review the elements of trust man-
agement systems: how to name principals, objects, and
logic sets; the trust requirements to satisfy in a net-
worked system; the security assumptions and design
choices that guide the implementation of SAFE. Some
of the design choices are influenced by previous work on
trust management—specifically, the local namespaces of
SPKI/SDSI [20] and self-certifying names in [35, 34].
However one major difference of SAFE compared to SP-
KI/SDSI is set linking: SAFE provides an explicit link-
ing capability at the level of sets of logic statements
(slogsets) rather than implicit linking on names as in
SPKI/SDSI. Explicit linking makes credential discov-
ery [16] and revocation practical and scalable compared
to SPKI/SDSI: the name resolution requires the autho-
rizer to resolve the relevant certificates among a poten-
tially large set of certificates in the right order; in the
common case, the authorizer may simply act as a com-
pliance proof checker putting the onus on the requester
to carry the trust relationships.
2.1 Naming
SAFE relies on cryptographic keys for identifying the
principals following SPKI/SDSI. A principal is a self-
signed public key—i.e., a principal possesses the private
key corresponding to the public key that is signed—or an
attested public key by a trusted third party following the
current Certifying Authorities (CAs) model. Every prin-
cipal speaks indirectly through sub-principals by creat-
ing and assigning roles or by issuing speaksFor del-
egation to alleviate key rotation issues and keeping the
master keypair stored securely off-line. Principals create
local namespaces to keep track of resources they own,
capabilities they receive, endorsements they make, or
bookmark references to other principal’s namespace that
may contain relevant trust policies for a later retrieval.
A principal’s namespace is identified globally and
uniquely by a pair <principal, name> known as a
self-certifying identifier or scid for short. Self-certifying
names provide the useful property that any entity in a
distributed system can verify the binding between a cor-
responding public key and the local name without relying
on a trusted third party [34]. Self-certifying names thus
provide a decentralized form of data origin authentica-
tion. Without loss of generality, the scids are defined as
H1(principal):H2(name), where H1 and H2 are cryp-
tographic hash corresponding to the tuples, giving us a
fixed length scid irrespective of the key sizes and sym-
bolic names.
In SAFE, a principal’s namespace corresponds to a
slogset in which credentials and policies are stated as
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logical statements. In addition to scid, each slogset
can be identified by a secure reference (or id for
short), which is formed by taking a hash of scid, i.e.,
H3(H1(principal):H2(name)). An identity slogset is
a special set without a name and contains principal’s pub-
lic key. For the identity slogset, the scid and the id are
equal.
Objects in SAFE are identified by their scids. SAFE
recognizes three types of objects: credential objects
(slogsets) for which the local name is chosen by the is-
suer; resource objects for which the local name is auto-
generated using an RFC 4122 GUID/UID; and content
objects for which the local name is the hash of the con-
tents. SAFE provides a built-in rootId() to extract
the controlling principal name from an object name.
SAFE does not mandate a single global namespace or
a central certifying authority. In SAFE, each principal is
a certifying authority. Explicit endorsement and the abil-
ity to link slogsets by reference provides more flexible
design choices without assuming any naming convention
a priori. Where required, the hierarchical naming can
be represented by aggregating scids explicitly. For ex-
ample, a DNS request such as cs.duke.edu can be
represented in SAFE as:
H1(P.) : H2(edu)).H1(Pedu) : H2(duke).H1(Pduke) : H2(cs),
where Pname represents the principal owning the name
and H1,H2 are hash functions. Once P.{dot} is available
(browsers can bootstrap trust anchors following today’s
practices), SAFE can be queried to infer the IP address
securely subsuming DNSSec or other secure DNS im-
plementations. Such aggregation of scids across multi-
ple principals (with ‘.’ as the delimiter) to form a secure
compound names is known as safe resource naming or
SRN for short. We explain the secure name resolution
implemented in SAFE further in Sec 3.4.
2.2 Requirements
To use the trust logic in a networked system the following
requirements must be met: (1) network messages can be
authenticated as originating from a named principal; (2)
each statement in the logic is authenticated to its named
speaker; (3) each object name is securely bound to a
given principal who controls the name; (4) to the extent
that one party accepts or relies on another’s statements,
the parties must agree on the meaning of predicate sym-
bols and names used in those statements.
Without loss of generality we meet the first two re-
quirements by taking principal name constants as public
keys (or hashes) and transporting statements in certifi-
cates signed by the named speaker, following SDSI.
The third requirement is trivially met with local
namespaces, i.e., each principal hash its own object name
space and requests for those objects are served only
through a server controlled by that principal.
The fourth requirement is met by standards and con-
ventions in the code. SAFE applications may define their
own vocabulary of predicates. Note that common con-
ventions are needed only for interoperability, but not for
soundness. The soundness of SAFE inference requires
only that statements are authentic and that the relevant
name constants are unique and distinct.
2.3 Assumptions
We make the certain assumptions about the threat model,
SafeSets availability, principal keypairs, and credential
linking.
• The SAFE client running the inference should be a
part of trusted computing base. All other compo-
nents including SafeSets need not be trusted.
• SafeSets is configured to be highly available storage
system. With scalable key-value stores, this require-
ment is easily met.
• Every principal creates sub-principals to speaks for
them and stores the master key-pair securely off-
line.
• All delegations, speaksFor, set construction, and
linking are done explicitly through logical asser-
tions, i.e., SAFE does not support implicit delega-
tions as in [2].
3 Managing Credentials Declaratively
This section presents an overview of how SAFE applica-
tions use trust logic languages (slog and slang) to build
and issue credentials as slogsets, how slogsets can be
linked for credential discovery, and how a set linking
supports policy mobility. It illustrates with examples
from SafeGENI, which is described in a related technical
report [15]. The GENI trust architecture defines several
classes of authority services to manage user identity and
authorize user activity. These services are decentralized:
each authority service may have multiple instances, and
the set of instances may change over time. In addition,
users may delegate various rights to one another using a
capability model. SafeGENI specifies all of these struc-
tures using logic.
A notable feature of SAFE is integration of the trust
logic with a scripting layer that manipulates logic content
and invokes the proof engine. Slog is a tractable logic
language that generates a proof locally from a supplied
proof context. Who supplies the proof context and how
is it assembled? The slang provides scripting constructs
to build and modify slogsets from templates, link them
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to form unions, publish/post them (e.g., as certificates
written to SafeSets), pass or fetch them by reference, and
add them to query contexts for trust decisions.
An application includes slang code to construct any
logic content it issues or fetch and cache logic content
from other parties, assemble proof contexts, issue trust
queries, and organize its credentials and policies. Each
participant in a networked system chooses the slang code
that it executes: the participants exchange declarative
logic content, but not scripting code.
3.1 SAFE Logic (slog)
Slog is a elementary trust logic based on constrained dat-
alog, which is a subset of first-order logic. Logic state-
ments in slog are written in datalog augmented with the
classic says operator of BAN belief logic [13] and ABLP
logic [26]. Statements are built up from atomic formulas
(atoms) and the logical operators conjunction and impli-
cation. An atom is a predicate symbol applied to a list of
parameters, which may be variables or constants repre-
senting principals, objects, or values. Every atom has a
first parameter representing a principal who says it (the
speaker). Consider this slog statement:
authorize(?Subj) :-
Alice: coworker(?Subj).
This statement reads “self infers authorize(?Subj), for
any given subject represented by a variable ?Subj, if the
principal Alice says coworker(?Subj) is true”. The :- is
datalog syntax for logical implication: this statement is
a rule. The text to the left of the :- is the head of the
rule, and the text to the right is the body. The head is a
single atom whose parameters may include one or more
variables (?Subj). A rule allows the checker to infer
that the head is true, for some substitution of its variables
with constants, if the body is true under that substitution.
The body is a sequence of atoms (called goals) separated
by commas, which indicate conjunction: all of the atoms
in the body must be true for the rule to “fire”. All vari-
ables in the head must also appear in the body. A fact is a
statement with no body, and therefore no variables. The
checker takes any fact in the context as true. The pred-
icate in an atom or fact represents a property, attribute,
role, relationship, right, power, or permission associated
with the principals and/or objects named in its parame-
ters.
Each atom is bound to a speaker. In the example, the
atoms in the body are prefixed with a says operator (:)
naming the principal Alice. If an atom does not name
a speaker then the default speaker is $Self—the local
authorizer who applies the statement. Note also that the
speaker of an atom in the body of a rule may be a vari-
able. Consider this rule from SafeGENI:
Function Description
fetch(?SetRef) fetch a transitive closure of slogset
ref by traversing all the links
fetchSRN(
?SetRef,
?SRN)
fetch a transitive closure of slogset
ref by traversing the links as guiding
by the safe resource name (SRN)
post(
?SetContents)
post the set contents and return the
slogset reference.
Table 1: Slang library functions implementing the SafeSets
Client API.
memberAuthority(?X) :- geniRoot(?Geni),
?Geni: memberAuthority(?X).
This rule reads “self infers that ?X is a Member Au-
thority, for any given ?X, if some principal ?Geni says
it is, and self believes that ?Geni is the GENI root”. A
GENI root is a principal that is accepted by members
of a GENI federation to endorse authority services and
IaaS providers (aggregates). The policy may include
or import a fact designating a geniRoot trust anchor.
A GENI Member Authority is a principal that is au-
thorized to issue statements about user identity includ-
ing roles, privileges, account status, and key endorse-
ments. This rule states that the authorizer believes an
assertion (memberAuthority(?X)) if it is spoken
by any principal (?Geni) possessing a certain attribute
(geniRoot(?Geni)). This form of rule is known as
an attribute-based delegation [32].
The goals in policy rules such as these capture the
meaning of delegation of trust. The delegation is re-
stricted both by the speaker of the goal and the predicate
used. For example, the rule above trusts a geniRoot
only to endorse a memberAuthority, and it trusts
the endorsed principal only as a memberAuthority.
Other rules in SafeGENI delegate specific additional
powers to principals with the attributes geniRoot or
memberAuthority.
3.2 SAFE Language (slang)
Slang is a simple hybrid functional-logic programming
language with an extended logic syntax supporting
higher order structures with nested function symbols.
Slang is designed to be used as a scripting language for
credential discovery, credential pruning (tailoring proof
context based on authorizer’s policies and the issued re-
quest), and certificate issuing and revocation. A slang
program is a set of logic statements similar to the slog
program but structurally akin to Prolog programs rather
than Datalog programs. However, a crucial difference is
that slang programs are local to the authorizer and not
transported over network unlike slogsets. Alternatively,
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slang programs assist the credential discovery process
and building proof context tailored to the request—but
the programs themselves are not part of trust infrastruc-
ture and inference. SAFE considers the authorization de-
cision as valid only if slog performs the inference.
A slang program permits usage of higher order con-
structs to process collections: lists, nested predicates,
and slogsets as first class objects. For example, slogsets
can be manipulated as values directly by assigning them
to variables and passing them as arguments to other func-
tions.
Other important distinction from slog is that slang
statements may act as functions that return values, in-
cluding slogsets. In general, slang programs execute as
a functional evaluation rather than inference: the evalu-
ation follows a deterministic path with no backtracking,
presuming that for each slang predicate there is at most
one rule with a matching head (the common case).
The design of slang is motivated in part by our experi-
ence with building authorization system for GENI.
• Current approaches for authorization are limited:
either support a high level language compromis-
ing on proof tractability (e.g., PCA [5], Policy-
Maker [11], KeyNote [12], NAL [39]) or restricted
language leaving the credential gathering to the ap-
plications (e.g., SecPAL [9], Soutei [36]).
• We used slog as an embedded language library
from a generic purpose language and observed the
impedance mismatch between language layers. For
example, the slog program is passed as a string
from the host language, which results in deferring
the “safety” properties of slog until actual execution
time.
• We observed common patterns (fetching, pub-
lishing, and renewing) for managing credentials
which are handled efficiently using a high level
abstraction—manipulating slogsets as values.
• Certain useful logical primitives such as
speaksFor and aggregation cannot be
captured at the slog layer but can be easily achieved
at higher layer without compromising tractability
of the logical inference [21].
• Writing slog code directly is tedious and prone to
mistakes since the principals and objects are hashed
values rather than simple mnemonic names. Slang
makes it particularly convenient to define policies
naturally through the use of lexically scoped pro-
gram variables, environment variables that capture
system properties, and builtin library functions that
operate on slogsets directly.
defcon endorse(?IdP) :-
spec('endorse an identity provider'),
''endorse/idp/$IdP''{ // slogset name
identityProvider($IdP). // variable subst
link($Self). // link to self (geni) ID set
} // end of slogset definition
end // end of slang function
definit ?Ref := endorse('IdP-ID'), post(?Ref).
Listing 1: Geni root endorses and IdP.
• Slang also supports programming through policy
templates so that policies are written once and in-
stantiated accordingly as per the environment con-
text and scope.
• Lastly, slang is declarative and resembles slog
closely while being expressive. Slang performs tra-
ditional scripting functions: file manipulation, es-
caping to the host environment for program execu-
tion, and variable substitution.
Consider the GENI example in Code List-
ing 1. Geni root creates a slogset with a name
‘‘endorse/idp/$IdP’’ and issues simple slog
statements endorsing an identity provider (IdP). The
statements enclosed within { } forms a first-class
slogset term extending the standard logic syntax to sets
of statements. Slang supports lexical scoping and global
substitution of variables. $IdP is a variable passed from
slang to slog, which is interpolated—substituted by its
value—at runtime. A slang rule tagged with a def
keyword declares the rule as a function that returns the
value of the last atom on that rule. The various slang
rule types have additional behaviors to integrate with the
application and with SafeSets, and to extend the script-
ing primitives. Slang predefines some functions with
prefixes defenv for initializing environment variables;
defcon for constructing slogsets; defguard for entry
points to slang program for access checking incoming
requests; and definit for bootstrapping the slang
program. Other built-in functions that implement the
SafeSets client API are shown in Table 1. Code Listing 2
shows how a Project Investigator (PI) relies on local
trust policy and bearer reference provided by the subject
to determine whether the subject is a valid geni user. In
this case, it is the subject’s responsibility to provide a
reference to a slogset, which contains a statement that
the issued by IdP that the subject is a geni user. The
authorizer augments the proof context constructed from
bearer reference with its own local policy and invokes
the slog inference. This example demonstrates the
flexible and extensible authorization in SAFE in which
hybrid policies are fetch on-demand or a priori at the
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discretion of the authorizer. See the technical report for
a complete working example of GENI [15].
Slang also supports speaksFor and
speaksForOn delegation in a restricted form.
Our implementation of speaksForOn closely fol-
lows restriction delegation proposed in Snowflake
project [24, 23]. However, unlike ABLP [2] and
Snowflake [24] projects, we do not view speaksFor
as a primitive form of delegation. Recall that slog
supports attribute-based delegation with says as the
primitive operator. In SAFE, the restricted speaksFor
is defined as follows: if a subject Alice issues
speaksFor delegation capability for Bob, then
Alice grants Bob to write to any slogset owned
by Alice. Similarly, speaksForOn restricts the
capability to a particular slogset named by Alice.
Now when Bob is issuing statements for Alice, it is
Bob’s responsibility to write to an appropriate slogset
under the Alice namespace. The speaksFor and
speaksForOn are stated as ordinary slog facts but
interpreted specially by slang to achieve the desired
functionality. In SAFE, we use speaksForOn delega-
tion for joint ownership among principals in a group and
principal/sub-principal roles, and delegating authority
to a set of attributes (slogset) collectively rather than
specifying each attribute individually as in ABAC [32].
Lastly, slang also provides support for
aggregation, which cannot be supported directly
in slog without loosing tractability [21]. Aggregation
is useful to implement advanced features in trust log-
ics such as threshold/manifold structures as used by
SPKI/SDSI.
3.3 Set Linking and Support Sets
The power of trust logics creates new obstacles to har-
nessing their power in practical distributed systems. For
example, authorization in decentralized federated envi-
ronments involve finding the necessary credentials that
satisfy the local policy for a given access control request.
A key obstacle is credential discovery: a trust decision
may require reasoning from statements drawn from vari-
ous sources, requiring a method to discover and retrieve
them. In general, credential discovery is the process of
finding the chain of credentials that delegates the au-
thority from the source to the requester. Credential dis-
covery is different from the certificate path discovery in
X.509 certificates [19] since credentials in trust manage-
ment systems generally have more complex meanings
than simply binding names to public keys. For example,
a credential chain is often a DAG, rather than a linear
path as in X.509.
Most previous work in trust management assumes that
authorizer has already gathered all the potentially rele-
defenv ?Geni :- 'geni-ID'. // hash-of-geni-PK
defcon trustStructure() :-
spec('trust structure at the authorizer'),
'policy/localTrust'{
identityProvider(?X) :-
geniRoot(?Geni),
?Geni: identityProvider(?X).
geniUser(?U) :-
identityProvider(?IdP),
?IdP: geniUser(?U).
}
end
defguard isGeniUser(?Subject, ?BearerRef) :-
{
import('policy/localTrust').
import($BearerRef). // slogset reference
geniRoot($Geni). // substitute env var
geniUser($Subject)? // subst slang var
}
end
Listing 2: Project Investigator (PI) relies on local trust
policy and bearer reference passed by the ?Subject to
determine whether ?Subject is a valid geni user.
vant credentials before a request is made and does not
consider credential discovery problem further [11, 12, 9].
Even if the authorizer gathers all the credentials a priori,
a crucial issue is that tailoring the credentials per query
request rather than supplying all the available credentials
to the proof context—since the cost of inference depends
on the size of the proof context.
To make the credential discovery possible and effi-
cient, we propose set linking to build trust chains by link-
ing relevant logic sets in advance. A further advantage of
our approach is that it naturally supports caching of con-
text sets for future decisions.
The construction procedure is distributed across the
participants who issue and receive credentials—slogsets
containing endorsements and delegations. Each partici-
pant collects and stores the received credentials by using
meta-predicate link to cross reference them into cre-
dential sets that it maintains. The issuer of a credential
uses link in the set constructor to link the new set to
any of its own credential sets that support its authority to
issue the credential. Code Listing 1 shows link pred-
icate is used as a reference to Geni root’s ID set. If all
issuers follow this convention then by induction the tran-
sitive closure of any given credential contains the totality
of upstream credentials that an authorizer needs to vali-
date it—the credential’s support set. In this way, set link-
ing naturally forms delegation chains in the credential
graph. The authorizer uses its local checker to validate
that these chains lead back to one or more trust anchors
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(e.g., geniRoot) according to its policies.
The bearer reference link (id) provided by the sub-
ject (?BearerRef in Code Listing 2) makes the autho-
rizer to inspect the user endorsements that she received.
Linked support sets make it easy for an authorizer to ob-
tain all credentials necessary for an authorization deci-
sion by “pulling” a credential set token passed as an ar-
gument in a request, fetching the closure of the linked
subsets recursively, caching them, and adding them to
the proof context. Each participant is free to organize
its credentials as it sees fit, possibly across multiple sets.
What is important is that each issuer links sufficient sup-
port into each endorsement or delegation, and that each
requester passes sufficient support to justify each request.
The linked sets may contain a superset of what is re-
quired: the authorizer’s slog engine searches the context
for relevant content. We emphasize that in practice, a
server finds frequently linked supporting credentials in
its cache, and does not fetch or validate them again on
each request.
In this way, set linking organizes credentials and poli-
cies into a DAG that facilitates discovery and assembly
of proof contexts. We note that fetch is cycle-safe: it ig-
nores any cycles, which do not affect the contents of the
closure. The DAG is collaboratively editable: each node
in the DAG is controlled by its owners, and changes to a
set by its owners are visible in other sets that link to it.
The sets are, in essence, materialized views for standard
queries, in which the subset owners control what state-
ments to include in the views.
Further, set linking naturally supports policy mobility:
the guard policies can be defined once by the trust an-
chors and the authorizers can use them wherever appli-
cable by simply fetching from SafeSets.
3.4 End-to-End Example: SafeNS
We implemented a secure name service—SafeNS—in
SAFE. Using SafeNS, we emulate the DNSSec resolver
in SAFE. Figure 1 illustrative the end-to-end workflow
of credential discovery, set linking, context building and
pruning using SafeNS as an example.
Given a name service request by the client, the
browser/client-agent augments the request with a boot-
strapped reference to the root (ICAANN-ID) slogset
and passes to the SafeNS resolver. The SafeNS re-
solver uses the bearer reference to initiate the creden-
tial discovery process using a slang library function
fetchSRN(). The resolver fetches the root set refer-
enced by ICAANN-ID and matches the common name
for the root (cn(.)) with the first name token ‘.’ by
issuing a slog query. If the slog query returns true—i.e.,
the safe resource name (SRN) binds/matches with the
slogset local name given by the srn() predicate—then
the search continues further following the link predi-
cates until a closure is reached. The slang runtime builds
a tailored context based on the SRN, and once the search
completes, slang invokes slog with the relevant proof
context. The slog process validates the proof based on
local trust anchors (ICAANN-ID) and policies, and cer-
tifies the response. The workflow also illustrates the use
of speaksForOn issued by the principal duke dele-
gating ownership to the principal cs on a particular set
named cs.
SafeNS resolver curtails the proof context at each
stage of the credential discovery by using a constrained
function fetchSRN() rather than fetch() (see Ta-
ble 1). fetch() fetches the transitive closure name
service endorsements starting from root to the proof con-
text, which is prohibitive if not curtailed to the relevant
context. It is important to note that fetchSRN() is
implemented as a slang library function (in 30 lines of
code) rather than a native implementation. The context
resolver is programmable: for example, the authorizer
can add custom rules to accept content only from author-
itative servers located in the US region.
4 Implementation
The SAFE project builds on the earlier research in logic-
based trust management by focusing on logical trust as
a systems problem. Elements of the SAFE project in-
clude integration with application service frameworks, a
deployment structure that facilitates cross-language in-
teroperability, programming tools to construct policies
and credentials for logical trust, and a decoupling from
the external representations to transport the logic.
4.1 SAFE Runtime
SAFE runs as an interpreter with one or more slang
programs loaded into it. The slang code can run from
command-line tools or within a co-located SAFE process
invoked through a REST API, or it can integrate directly
with JVM applications. The code’s behavior is deter-
mined not just by the slang code itself but also by the
logic content passed to it. Any participant may add local
rules to tailor the policies to local needs, without chang-
ing the slang program. Participants may even formulate
rules and exchange them over the network as the system
executes.
The interpreter is stateless, so participants may restart
it and/or reload slang programs at any time: it affects
only the access control for future requests. Slang pro-
grams are composable: it is easy to add code to cus-
tomize the local behavior. Changing the program leaves
other software and state unchanged at the site.
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Figure 2: Server access control using SAFE. The SAFE instance runs as a separate process with a loaded program of slang that
contains context building procedure, the principal’s signing key ($Self), and the authorizer’s local policies specified in slog. The
server application installs slang code in the SAFE process, which registers all the defguard APIs for access control checks.
Credentials are passed as references to signed logic sets (slogsets) in a shared distributed store (SafeSets). The SAFE process
fetches slogsets on demand, validates the signature and speaker, and caches them for use by the slog interpreter.
SAFE is implemented in Scala language including the
inference engine written from scratch. Source code for
SAFE is available at [38].
Slang and SafeSets offer an integrated solution for
sharing authenticated logic sets in a networked system.
Each authorizer’s local SAFE runtime interacts with the
SafeSets service to support the set abstractions of slang
by fetching referenced sets on demand, caching their
logic content, and assuring the freshness and validity of
logic content passed to the proof engine. The SAFE run-
time handles secure slogset id generation, post, fetch,
and cryptographic operations automatically and transpar-
ently.
Because the slang scripting language abstracts these
details and hides them from applications, SafeSets is
a replaceable component within the SAFE architecture.
However, the idea of using a shared decentralized cer-
tificate store generalizes to other models for storing and
authenticating the sets. In principle, logic sets could be
stored in secure web directories maintained for the own-
ing principals, or in some scenarios might be stored bare
in a trusted metadata service, e.g., for use of trust logic
within a single service provider domain.
When a program defines a slogset (using defcon)),
the builtin encoder consumes the meta-facts and encodes
the information they contain into the selected certificate
format. When SAFE fetches a certificate, the builtin de-
coder validates the certificate, extracts the contents, and
materializes it as an in-memory slogset. The slogset rep-
resents the relevant meta-information from the certificate
as logic meta-facts. These facts are available to the slog
inference engine if the set is added to the context for a
query.
The SafeSets service itself is implemented as a proxy
shim to a scalable Riak key/value store [37]. On a post
operation, the slogset id serves as the key, and the named
certificate is the value. The shim checks access for post
operations: it verifies that the value (a certificate con-
taining a logic set) is signed under a public key whose
hash yields the slogset id, when when hashed with the
local name. The shim is implemented using SAFE itself:
it is a SAFE process with slang code that invokes ordi-
nary certificate parsing and validation, queries the meta-
attributes, and performs the guard check. SafeSets clients
access the Riak store only through the shim, which serves
the Riak request protocol. This is a simple example of us-
ing SAFE to “safeguard” a network service transparently,
as an alternative to modifying the service or integrating
with a service framework.
4.2 SafeSets Certificate Store
Slang and SafeSets offer an integrated solution for shar-
ing authenticated logic sets in a networked system. Each
authorizer’s local SAFE runtime interacts with the Safe-
Sets service to support the set abstractions of slang by
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fetching referenced sets on demand, caching their logic
content, and assuring the freshness and validity of logic
content passed to the proof engine. The SAFE run-
time handles secure slogset id generation, post, fetch,
and cryptographic operations automatically and transpar-
ently.
Because the slang scripting language abstracts these
details and hides them from applications, SafeSets is
a replaceable component within the SAFE architecture.
However, the idea of using a shared decentralized cer-
tificate store generalizes to other models for storing and
authenticating the sets. In principle, logic sets could be
stored in secure web directories maintained for the own-
ing principals, or in some scenarios might be stored bare
in a trusted metadata service, e.g., for use of trust logic
within a single service provider domain.
When a program defines a slogset (using defcon)),
the builtin encoder consumes the meta-facts and encodes
the information they contain into the selected certificate
format. When SAFE fetches a certificate, the builtin de-
coder validates the certificate, extracts the contents, and
materializes it as an in-memory slogset. The slogset rep-
resents the relevant meta-information from the certificate
as logic meta-facts. These facts are available to the slog
inference engine if the set is added to the context for a
query.
SAFE supports compact, reliable encoding of logic
sets in X.509 certificates (using a string encoding within
an attribute field) and also in a native SAFE format. The
crypto layer represents all semantic content of any signed
certificate internally in common logic, including builtin
predicates for meta-attributes such as expiration time, en-
coding type, and so on. It generates the encoded cert
from a slogset containing the required meta-attributes as
facts, which are easy to specify directly in slang set con-
structors (defcon. The native SAFE cert format is not
subject to the arbitrary length constraints of X.509 cer-
tificates, and also improves compactness by hashing pub-
lic keys embedded as principal names in the logic. All of
our experiments use the native SAFE cert format.
The SafeSets service itself is implemented as a proxy
shim to a scalable Riak key/value store [37]. On a post
operation, the slogset id serves as the key, and the named
certificate is the value. The shim checks access for post
operations: it verifies that the value (a certificate con-
taining a logic set) is signed under a public key whose
hash yields the slogset id, when when hashed with the
local name. The shim is implemented using SAFE itself:
it is a SAFE process with slang code that invokes ordi-
nary certificate parsing and validation, queries the meta-
attributes, and performs the guard check. SafeSets clients
access the Riak store only through the shim, which serves
the Riak request protocol. This is a simple example of us-
ing SAFE to “safeguard” a network service transparently,
as an alternative to modifying the service or integrating
with a service framework.
4.3 Server Integration
Application server frameworks can use SAFE as a proxy
or invoke through REST API to check access control
for client operations on the objects they server (see Fig-
ure 2). Suppose that each API method of the service has
registered a corresponding guard in the slang program
through defguard. When a request enters the Web ap-
plication or service framework, it invokes SAFE to eval-
uate a declared guard whose name matches the requested
method, passing a list of variables named in the request.
SAFE evaluates the guard and returns the result to the
service framework, which rejects the service request if
the result is false. Ideally there is no change to the ap-
plication itself, other than defining slang guards for each
method. The SAFE runtime passes the request parame-
ters for each method to the registered SAFE guards via
defguard.
4.4 Fetching, Validation, and Caching
SAFE fetches slogsets automatically on first reference to
a token in the slang program. The client side code per-
forms a cycle-safe recursive fetch and the requests are
parallelized using a thread pool for reduced latency. Af-
ter each subset is fetched, SAFE validates the signature,
parses the certificate, and authenticates the stated speaker
of each statement. If the certificate is valid, its con-
tents are extracted into an in-memory logic set, including
meta-attributes. Sets created in slang or imported from
SafeSets are cached in an in-memory as slogset cache.
The fetch checks the set cache for each subset token en-
countered during the recursive fetch.
When a sub-context is assembled and dispatched to
the inference engine, SAFE renders it to a internal con-
text format and caches it in a context cache. A rendered
context set is flattened, then indexed to speed up the in-
ference engine, which must search for rules with heads
matching each goal. The expiry date on the context cache
is set to the lowest expiry dates from the collections of
sub-contexts that are assembled. SAFE tracks the pe-
riod of validity internally to expunge any expired content
from the caches. A leaf subset expires from the slogset
cache at the expiration time of its containing certificate.
We also added support to invalidate a cached context at
the earliest expiration time of any statement it contains,
so the proof engine sees only fresh logic content. If an
expired certificate is reissued, then a fetch pulls the fresh
certificate from the store automatically.
We enhanced server integration by adding initial sup-
port for a query decision cache on the Web server side.
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function compute hash verify signature sign a set parse a set null inference fetch a set post a set
latency (ms) 0.13 0.56 12.14 2.2 0.09 7.8 27.4
Table 2: Micro-benchmarks of basic operations in SAFE on 1kB of payload per certificate. Fetch and post costs are network
latencies over WAN for reading and writing/updating a slogset to SafeSets. Keys are 2048-bit RSA keys. Hash function is set to
SHA-256. The null inference is the minimum latency penalty for querying slog through slang.
The result cache optimizes repeated operations by a
given subject on a given object, by avoiding the infer-
ence check entirely for a configurable time. We do not
report results from decision cache.
4.5 Certificate Management
SAFE and SafeSets address a number of longstanding
challenges for certificate management.
Renewal. An issuer may renew an expired certificate
by posting the renewed certificate to SafeSets with the
same identifier, overwriting the expired certificate. If a
SAFE authorizer encounters an expired set it uses the
identifier to fetch a new version automatically, and re-
tries the query.
Revocation. An issuer may change a posted logic set
at any time or “poison” the set to invalidate it. Of course,
a change or poison does not take effect if an authorizer
uses an old copy of the set from its cache. An issuer may
control the expiration times to bound the time that a set
remains in an authorizer’s cache by setting the refresh
time on the published set. An authorizer may refresh sets
in its cache at its discretion, even if they have not expired.
Rotation. SAFE with SafeSets names principals by
their public key hashes. If a principal loses or rotates
its key-pair, then sets that incorporate the stale key in
their set identifiers must be regenerated. To avoid po-
tentially expensive set identifiers regeneration, SAFE ad-
vocates each principal to create sub-principals which
speaksFor the master on a given role (e.g., signing,
encryption).
The SAFE approach to managing credentials also
raises some potential concerns which we discuss in
Sec 6.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate SAFE on mix of cache configurations,
micro-benchmarks, and real applications. We seek to an-
swer three questions:
Q1. Does SAFE achieve acceptable performance? How
SAFE compares to ACLs and capability based ac-
cess control where policies are attached directly to
entities rather than managed independently through
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Figure 3: Cost of inference with varying proof length and
degree of backtracking bd . The latency measurements
show that the inference cost scales linearly if bd is kept
low. The plot also shows the overhead of calling slog
from slang program is minimal (< 5%).
SAFE reference monitor? What is the overhead of
invoking slog through slang?
Q2. Are trust logics practical for use and deploy in real
applications? What is the programming effort re-
quired to build secure applications using SAFE as
the foundation for trust management and access
control?
Q3. How does set linking and context caching improve
performance across space (cross-sharing of com-
mon slogsets among multiple simultaneous queries)
and time (caching frequently accessed slogsets)?
All our authorizer experiments are conducted on eight
core Intel Xeon CPU E5520 @ 2.27GHz processor with
hyper-threading enabled and 8 GB of RAM running
CentOS 5.10. The SafeSets cluster consists of four
VMs, each with a single core Intel Xeon CPU E5620
@ 2.40GHz processor and 1GB of RAM interconnected
by a 1Gb network, all running Ubuntu 14.04. The au-
thorizer access the SafeSets store over WAN. We use un-
modified Riak 2.0 [37] as our key-value store for Safe-
Sets guarded by SAFE as a proxy “shim” to authorize
writes to a slogset.
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Figure 4: Performance comparison of issuing a write to SafeSets store (a write is a post with slogset signing excluded).
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(b) SafeGENI authorization cost with delegations of length 6
Figure 5: Performance comparison of SAFE applications. Subplots 5a and 5b show the performance of SafeNS and SafeGENI
systems respectively.
5.1 Micro benchmarks
To answer the first question, we use micro-benchmarks
to evaluate SAFE performance. Table 2 show the over-
head of basic operations in SAFE on a 1kB of payload
per certificate. The slogset identifiers use SHA-256 for
hashing and base64 for encoding, which result in fixed 44
byte strings. For signing, we use 2048-bit RSA keys. The
null inference is the minimum latency penalty of query-
ing slog inference through slang. The overhead is pro-
portional to the size of proof context size and the number
of environment variables which are globally substituted
from slang to slog. A fetch here is a single slogset re-
trieved from SafeSets without traversing any links. A
fetch is verified for its authenticity—by verifying the sig-
nature on the slogset—at the authorizer. On the contrary,
posting a slogset requires the client to sign its contents
and send it to the SafeSets server over the secure channel
to prevent replay attacks. The SafeSets server nodes are
guarded by SAFE to determine whether the requesting
principal has write access to the slogset either directly
or through speaksFor* capability. For the micro-
benchmark, both fetch and post including the cost of ver-
ification and signing the slogset. Table 2 shows latency
of post is 4X times the latency of fetch: post is expensive
since each post is idempotent and performs read-modify-
update to a slogset.
To analyze the cost of inference, we simulated del-
egation chains which the number of unifications ex-
actly matches the proof length. We measure the la-
tency by varying the length of number of unifications
matching the goal from 1 to 1024 and the controlling
the degree of backtracking, bd . When bd is set to zero,
we have no backtracking and the length of the proof
chain is linear in terms of the unified goals in the input
query. Setting bd to zero approximates proof-carrying-
authorization (PCA [8]) where the length of the input is
exactly the length of the proof chain. In our applications
of SAFE, we observed that backtracking scenarios may
occur with attribute-based-delegation, where the princi-
pal on a goal is variable and the proof context have mul-
tiple rule heads matching on the same goal. However,
SAFE uses indexing on multiple parameters which often
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# Rules # SLOC
SafeSets 2 15
SafeNS 7 40
SafeGENI 30 110
Table 3: Analysis of programming effort for building declara-
tive trust applications in SAFE.
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Figure 6: End-to-end authorization costs of SafeGENI with
varying delegation lengths.
reduces the bd to a small value. Index optimization is
a work in progress. In our next experiment, we set bd to
10, i.e., each goal can have at most 10 possible rule heads
matching with the goal and the length of the proof chain
may grow exponentially with the input size. Figure 3
shows the latency measurements of when varying proof
chain length and bd . When bd is zero, latency grows lin-
early with the proof length, which is expected. However,
when bd is 10, it is interesting to note the latency remains
linear and only deviates from a linear scale at when the
number of unifications matching the goal (proof length
in this case) is 600 or above. The result shows that set
linking and tailoring proof contexts is important to keep
bd low, which will in turn help to scale the inference cost
linearly with the size of the input.
The latency costs in Figure 3 show that SAFE infer-
ence takes 0.1 ms per unification, which is competitive
with respect to identity based ACLs, which needs only
one fact checked. Further, the plot shows that compar-
ison of inference costs when input is feed directly to a
slog interpreter vs. executed from the slang program.
Recall that slang program will in turn invoke slog in-
terpreter after substituting all the environment variables.
The plot shows that overhead of calling slog from slang
is minimal (< 5%).
5.2 Applications of SAFE
We built authorization systems for three practical appli-
cations in SAFE. Table 3 shows the modest effort re-
quired to build applications using SAFE.
First, SafeSets uses SAFE as a proxy “shim” guard-
ing write access to slogsets. The post authorization for
SafeSets involves validating the speaker that signed the
set on the server to determine the set ownership. Safe-
Sets is also a good example to illustrate the application
of speaksFor and speaksForOn predicates, which
are implemented at slang as discussed in 3.2.
Figure 4a show the performance comparison of Safe-
Sets write (a write is a post with slogset signing exclued
on the client) without any authorization performed on the
server, where as Figure 4b show the performance com-
parison without any authorization but slogset parsed by
the server (baseline). Figure 4c show the performance
comparison of SafeSets write with server authorization
using SAFE.
The measurements show the peak throughput drops
by 63% due to parsing overhead—our parser is not
optimized—and the median latency increases by 50%
per write operation. If we compare the parsed slogset
on the server with the cost of authorization, then we ob-
serve that peak throughput drops by 8% and the median
latency increases by 9% per write operation. These plots
show that slog validation overhead is less than 10% for
simple proofs that emulate ACLs.
Second, we implemented secure name service—
SafeNS, discussed as in 3.4. For delegations of length
four (the average request sub-domains for a DNS query
is three), the 95% latency of proof validation cost of
SafeNS is 6ms, which is a fraction of DNS lookup la-
tency (in the order of tens of ms). Figure 5a shows the la-
tency and throughput measurements of a proof validation
for a NS query with delegation length four. We achieved
a throughput of 1600 auth ops/sec on our test suite with
one authorizer node.
Third, we prototyped authorization system for GENI,
which is a networked infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS)
system with autonomous IaaS providers linked in a fed-
erated trust structure. GENI serves as a full-featured
network trust example that includes distributed objects
(groups and slices3) with hybrid capability-based access
control, multiple object authorities, authority services for
group membership and federated identity management,
and a common root trust anchor that endorses the author-
ities and member sites.
The GENI trust architecture defines several classes of
authority services to manage user identity and authorize
user activity. These services are decentralized: each au-
thority service may have multiple instances, and the set
3A slice is a set of resources requested by an user
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Figure 7: Throughput measurements for SafeGENI bench-
mark with N set as 1024 and M set as 4096. The measurements
show caching proof contexts can help to achieve linear scaling
of throughput.
of instances may change over time. In addition, users
may delegate various rights to one another using a capa-
bility model. SafeGENI specifies all of these structures
using logic and implemented in 110 SLOCs of slang. For
delegations of length six, the 95% latency of authoriza-
tion cost for SafeGENI is under 10ms with a through-
put of 1400 authz ops/sec. The end-to-end authorization
cost including fetching from SafeSets, validating the sets
and ripping the crypto, building a context cache is under
20ms (see Fig 6). Most GENI delegations are smaller
than length 6. Figure 5b shows the latency and through-
put measurements of authorization costs of SafeGENI.
5.3 Impact of caching
To measure the impact of caching and context linking
on performance, we benchmark SafeGENI using a stan-
dard GENI workload with a mix of N users and M re-
sources. We set up delegation chains so that any user is
at most log2(N) delegations away from accessing a re-
source. We measure the throughput and latency of the
mix under three scenarios: (i) Baseline case: all certifi-
cates are processed in their entirety for each request with
no caching involved. This includes retrieving all cer-
tificates from in-memory, validate crypto and speakers,
render them to set cache, merge them to context cache,
and querying the inference. (ii) Cold caching with mono-
lithic contexts: the raw certificates are cached in memory
but the slogset cache and the context cache are build on-
demand. These context caches and slogset caches are
monolithic in that their life span tailored to a given re-
quest. (iii) Hot caching with set references and proof
context cache enabled. Here we cache the proof contexts
which enables shared credentials among queries is read-
ily available through the context cache.
Figure 7 shows the peak throughput measurements for
the three scenarios with N set as 1024 and M set as 4096.
The throughput for baseline case flattens out fast as ex-
pected since each request is processed in its entirety, i.e.,
by validating the certificates, ripping the contents, and
evaluating the query. Caching the certificates improves
throughput by 40%. However, the throughput flattens out
after 10 concurrent requests. With hot caching, the proof
contexts are shared across the queries resulting shared
trust policies and credentials avoiding the re-rendering
to proof context. The measurements show that through-
put scales linearly with hot contexts and demonstrates the
useful of caching proof contexts.
6 Discussion
The SAFE approach to managing credentials also raises
some potential concerns.
Malicious content. Issuers may write malformed cer-
tificates to SafeSets or generate a malformed credential
DAG, e.g., by creating cycles in the DAG. The SAFE
fetch procedure rejects malformed certificates and de-
tects cycles. Valid certificates contain only slog state-
ments, which share the termination properties of pure
datalog: all queries terminate. However, issuers may
create very large or costly slogsets to mount a denial of
service attack. An authorizer may bound the size of in-
coming logic sets and query contexts at its discretion.
Accountability. Policy mobility relies on participants
to enforce the policy rules of others. In general, enti-
ties control their own authorization decisions and have
power to do harm only to the extent that others trust
them. For example, a GENI aggregate that ignores pol-
icy conditions may be unduly promiscuous with its own
resources, but it cannot affect access to the resources of
others. Moreover, all entities are strongly accountable
(in the sense of CATS [42]) for certificates they post to
SafeSets representing the result of access decisions. Ac-
countability is an active research topic.
Confidentiality. Synthesized identifiers raise the issue
of confidentiality of policy rules and other logic material
stored in SafeSets. If an entity wants to protect a confi-
dential logic set it may salt the label: it is infeasible to
guess a hashed identifier that is effectively random. We
emphasize that the protection for writing to SafeSets is
stronger: a client must possess a principal’s private key
in order to write to a logic set that the principal controls.
Reclamation. Logic material may accumulate in
SafeSets over time. SafeSets may delete any set after it
has expired: all slogsets have expiration times. Even so,
issuers may use unreasonable expiration times or simply
post useless data to the store. SafeSets authenticates each
issuer by its public key, but quotas are of no help if an is-
suer can mint new keys at will. One option is to apply a
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SAFE access check for posting. Another option is to ar-
range the store so that each issuer provides and manages
its own storage (e.g., via a Web server).
SafeSets failure. Managing SafeSets as a decentral-
ized key-value store can be a scalable and reliable so-
lution. One or more entities may control the SafeSets
servers. A faulty or malicious server can destroy content
or block access to it. However, it cannot subvert the in-
tegrity of the system because all logic sets are signed by
their issuers.
7 Related Work
As flexible and extensible trust logic for federated net-
work systems, SAFE build upon a wealth of prior re-
sults. Thus, for SAFE, the closely related work cov-
ers the entire fields of study—including authorization
logic [9, 41, 18, 25, 8, 29], trust management [12, 11],
proof-carrying authorization [5, 27], and scalable storage
systems [17].
In general, trust logics apply common axioms of
ABLP access control calculus [2]. In particular, ev-
ery entity controls its own beliefs through axioms are
known as Hand-off and Bind respectively [1]. They en-
able sound trust policies and mobility of policy rules.
Many of these logics offer features that are not present
in slog: our research goal is not to advance trust log-
ics, but to facilitate their practical use. While at present
we see little need for features such as threshold/mani-
fold structures or negation, slog could grow to incorpo-
rate them without compromising tractability, following
SecPAL [9] and NAL [39]. However, SAFE supports a
simple negation restricting only queries to contain not
predicate to allow deny conditions (blacklists).
Some logics use (e.g., speaksFor and
speaksForOn) as primitive axioms to delegate
trust [2, 23, 39]. On the contrary, SAFE represents
delegation with rules in datalog-with-says, and uses
speaksFor predicates only for joint ownership or
to authorize third-party attributions, e.g., for service
proxies or portals that are trusted to issue statements for
which the named speaker is another party.
The paper uses set linking and linked contexts to ad-
dress the challenge of assembling the context for a proof.
One option is to require the caller to submit the proof to
the authorizer, as in Proof-Carrying Authorization [8].
PCA merely shifts the burden of assembling the context
to the caller. Our premise is that PCA is unnecessary
for a simple trust logic like datalog-with-says and care-
ful context management: constructing a datalog proof
from a small proof context can be fast. In contrast, the
AF logic that underlies PCA is intractable in the general
case. The other option is bearer credentials that are only
verified by the specific target service rather than any au-
thorizer as proposed by Macaroons [10] using HMACs.
More fundamentally, whether or not PCA is used,
the caller must identify the relevant credentials to send
with a request, or else the authorizer must obtain them
by some other means. Previous approaches to creden-
tial discovery are based on a distributed query model
(e.g., [33, 6, 7]). In SPKI/SDSI, the name resolution [16]
requires the authorizer to resolve the relevant certificates
among a potentially large set of certificates in the right
order. On the contrary, explicit set linking makes cre-
dential discovery scalable and practical. Many previous
works ignore the problem and presume that the caller
will identify the correct credentials and pass them in the
request. In these systems, the receiver/authorizer vali-
dates and checks the request credentials even if it has
already received them for a previous request. In contrast,
linked context sets naturally support caching and pass-
by-reference for credentials.
SafeSets facilitates certificate sharing via a highly
available shared store. The early X.500 model proposed
a distributed certificate repository, as discussed by the
SPKI/SDSI authors [20], who judge it to be impracti-
cal. A key difference is that SafeSets links certificates
by set identifiers, and does not rely on global princi-
pal names other than public keys, as advocated by SP-
KI/SDSI. Various other systems have proposed certifi-
cate storage for use in credentials-based authorization
(ConChord [4], CERTDIST [40]) using various indexing
and naming schemes, but they do not support set linking.
SafeSets supports secure unforgeable set identifiers for
a key/value store by qualifying them with a public key
hash. A similar technique has been used in many DHT
applications [35, 28].
8 Conclusion
SAFE is a open-source trust management system [38]
that uses a declarative trust logic to represent policies,
endorsements, and delegations. What is novel about
SAFE is the integration of the trust logic with a script-
ing language (“slang”) and shared storage abstraction
for authenticated logic content. These elements work
together to simplify and automate many aspects of net-
worked trust. In the implementation for this paper we
materialize logic sets as signed certificates, as in SPKI/S-
DSI, and store them in a scalable certificate store called
SafeSets. Each stored certificate is named by an identi-
fier suitable for indexing and caching linked certificates
or logic sets.
We use this combination to address three fundamental
problems: how to identify the content that is relevant to
a given trust decision, how to manage the flow of cre-
dentials through the system including caching, and how
to incorporate updates to outstanding certificates. Ex-
perience with SafeNS and SafeGENI shows that the ap-
proach is practical for a complex network trust system.
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